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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
The amici curiae are law professors who teach and write on civil procedure 
and/or patent law and policy.1  As such, amici are interested in the effective 
functioning of the courts and the patent system in ge eral.  Amici believe that this 
Court’s rigid rule restricting personal jurisdiction in patent declaratory judgment 
actions both flouts Supreme Court precedent and frustrates the public policy of 
clearing invalid patents.  Although amici hold different views on other aspects of 
modern patent law and policy, they are united in their professional opinion that this 
Court should overturn its inflexible jurisdictional rule.  
Amici have no stake in the parties or in the outcome of the case.  A complete 
list of amici appears at Appendix A.   
                                               
1 No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or pa t; no party or party’s 
counsel contributed money intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief; 
and no person other than amici, their members, or counsel contributed money 
intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.  Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5).  





Beginning with its 1998 decision in Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-
Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998), this Court has embraced a 
rigid, bright-line rule for the exercise of personal jurisdiction in patent declaratory 
judgment actions.  Specifically, the Court has held, based on “policy 
considerations unique to the patent context,” Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l 
Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted), that 
contacts created through unsuccessful attempts to license a patent can never be 
sufficient to create specific personal jurisdiction over a patent holder.  In contrast 
to that rigid, patent-specific rule, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized 
that the analysis of personal jurisdiction “is not susceptible of mechanical 
application,” Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978), and has instead 
required a case-by-case inquiry into the defendant’s contacts with the forum state 
and considerations of “fair play and substantial justice,” Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485–86 (1985) (internal quotations mitted).  Applying 
the analysis mandated by Supreme Court precedent, it is clear that personal 
jurisdiction exists in declaratory judgment actions, such as this one, where the 
patent holder purposefully targeted the forum state by sending demand letters into 
the state and engaging in in-person meetings in the stat  with the specific purpose 




  In addition, important public policy interests support allowing courts to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over patentees who engage in patent licensing 
activities targeted at the forum state.  The Supreme Court and Congress have 
consistently emphasized a strong public policy in clearing invalid patents from the 
marketplace.  The Declaratory Judgment Act furthers this policy by allowing 
accused infringers to obtain a decision on patent validity at a reasonable time and 
in a reasonable place.  The rigid rule established by Red Wing Shoe, however, 
frustrates the goal of encouraging patent challenges by granting patent holders 
unilateral control over where a declaratory judgment suit may be filed.   
  For these reasons, the Court should sua sponte consider this case n banc to 
overturn the restrictive jurisdictional rule established by Red Wing Shoe. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Red Wing Shoe’s Bright-Line Rule Conflicts with Controlling Supr eme 
Court Precedent and Is Inconsistent with This Court’s Own Case Law 
 Personal jurisdiction exists when a defendant has purposefully established 
minimum contacts with the forum state such that it “should reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court there.”  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U.S. 286, 297 (1980).  In addition, the personal jurisdiction analysis is informed by 
considerations of “fair play and substantial justice.”  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 464.  
Once a defendant has been shown to possess sufficient minimum contacts, the 




the exercise of personal jurisdiction is unreasonable.  Id. at 477.  In making the 
highly fact-intensive inquiry into personal jurisdiction, “the facts of each case must 
be weighed to determine whether the requisite affili ting circumstances are 
present.”  Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92 (internal quotations omitted); accord Burger King, 
471 U.S. at 485 (“[W]e . . . reject any talismanic jurisdictional formulas.”).  
 In contrast to the case-specific inquiry mandated by the Supreme Court, this 
Court in Red Wing Shoe adopted a bright-line rule that fairness considerations 
always prohibit the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on cease-and-desist 
letters sent into the forum state.  See 148 F.3d at 1360–61.  Relying on what the 
Court later characterized as “policy considerations u ique to the patent context,” 
Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1333, the Court reasoned that grounding personal jurisdiction 
on cease-and-desist letters would discourage settlem nt of disputed claims, thus 
failing to comport with principles of fairness, Red Wing Shoe, 148 F.3d at 1361.   
Since Red Wing Shoe, this Court has consistently applied and expanded this 
inflexible rule.  In Avocent, for example, the Court made clear that “[f]or the
exercise of personal jurisdiction to comport with fair play and substantial justice, 
there must be ‘other activities’ directed at the forum [state] . . . besides the letters 
threatening an infringement suit,” 552 F.3d at 1334 (internal quotations omitted), 
and that these “other activities” must “relate to the enforcement or the defense of 




Shoe, and over the dissent of Judge Newman, the Court ignored the contacts 
created through multiple cease-and-desist letters and then held that the patent 
holder’s sales of products in the forum state were also not sufficient to create 
jurisdiction over the patent owner in a declaratory judgment action.  Id. at 1337.  
Most recently, in Autogenomics, Inc., v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012 
(Fed. Cir. 2009), the Court, again over the dissent of Judge Newman, applied Red 
Wing Shoe and held there was no jurisdiction over a patent holder who had sent 
cease-and-desist letters into the forum state, engaged in licensing negotiations in 
the forum state, and entered license agreements concerni g the patents-in-suit with 
numerous companies located in the forum state.  Id. at 1014–15, 1019–21.  
The bright-line rule embraced in Red Wing Shoe, Avocent, and 
Autogenomics—that contacts formed through cease-and-desist letters and 
unsuccessful licensing negotiations can never be sufficient to create personal 
jurisdiction—is plainly inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.  Although this 
Court correctly recognized that cease-and-desist letters and concomitant licensing 
efforts give rise to sufficient minimum contacts, see Red Wing Shoe, 148 F.3d at 
1360, it deviated from Supreme Court precedent by adopting an inflexible rule that 
such contacts should never, in fairness, give rise to specific personal jurisdiction. 
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court delineated five factors for 




(1) the burden on the defendant, (2) “the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the 
dispute,” (3) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” 
(4) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient 
resolution of controversies,” and (5) the states’ shared interest “in furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies.”  444 U.S. at 292.  Under these factors, the 
defendant must make a “compelling case” that its particular burdens outweigh the 
other interests implicated in the case before the court.  See Charles W. Rhodes, 
Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 567, 
640–41 (2007) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477).  Such a showing is 
exceedingly rare.2  Nowhere in Red Wing Shoe or its progeny, however, did this 
Court balance those factors under the particular circumstances presented.  Instead, 
the Court effectively ignored the Supreme Court’s mandated analysis in favor of a 
pro-settlement policy.  
A proper application of the fairness factors illustrates that in certain cases—
including the one currently before the Court—personal jurisdiction is proper when 
a defendant has sent a cease-and-desist letter or engag d in other licensing 
                                               
2 Only once has the Supreme Court held that fairness con iderations precluded 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction.  See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior 
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (rejecting jurisdiction n a dispute by a 
Taiwanese tire manufacturer against its Japanese supplier, noting that “the 
international context, the heavy burden on the alien d fendant, and the slight 
interests of the plaintiff and the forum State” made “the exercise of personal 




activities directed at the plaintiff within a forum.  See Megan M. La Belle, Patent 
Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 43, 
90–97 (2010) (discussing how the fairness factors favor personal jurisdiction over 
certain patent holders who send cease-and-desist letters).  Here, there is simply no 
evidence that it would be particularly burdensome for the patent owner, Papst, to 
defend this action in California.  Indeed, representatives of Papst have previously 
traveled to California on several occasions to convince the plaintiffs-appellants to 
purchase licenses to the patents-in-suit.  Moreover, California is a “convenient and 
effective” forum for the plaintiffs-appellants, who are headquartered there.  World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.  And California plainly has an interest in 
adjudicating a dispute involving allegations that Clifornia-based companies are 
committing patent infringement in California. 
Indeed, it would be manifestly unfair not to exercise jurisdiction under these 
circumstances.  Under Red Wing Shoe, patentees like Papst can use their patent 
rights as a sword—for example, by sending letters into California accusing the 
plaintiffs-appellants of infringement, meeting with the plaintiffs-appellants’ agents 
in California, and extracting licensing revenue from California residents—but also 
be shielded from jurisdiction in California.  In short, in declaratory judgment cases 
such as this one, the patent owner cannot make a “compelling case” that the 




Furthermore, Red Wing Shoe’s narrow approach to specific personal 
jurisdiction in declaratory judgment actions is inco sistent with this Court’s own 
case law.  For instance, when patent holders initiate infringement suits, they have 
broad ability to hale accused infringers into federal court in practically any state.  
See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1444, 1451 (2010); 
Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice 
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 889, 920–22 (2001); see also Beverly Hills 
Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding 
personal jurisdiction over accused infringers who “purposefully shipped the 
accused [product] into [the forum state] through an established distribution 
channel”).3   
Red Wing Shoe’s bright-line rule is also inconsistent with the wight that this 
Court has given to licensing activity when assessing the presence of a domestic 
industry in patent cases before the International Tr de Commission (ITC).  In an 
action before the ITC, the complaint must establish the existence or imminent 
establishment of a domestic industry for the articles protected by the asserted 
                                               
3 It should be noted that a recent petition for a writ of mandamus in In re TC 
Heartland, LLC, No. 16-105 (Fed. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015), has urged the Court 
to overrule its case law conferring sweeping power over forum selection on 
patent infringement plaintiffs.  Although amici in this case take no position on 
the merits of the TC Heartland petition, the petition highlights the importance 
of forum-selection issues in modern patent law, including the question of 




patent.  19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2).  The statute further provides that “an industry in 
the United States shall be considered to exist if there is in the United States, with 
respect to the articles . . . (c) substantial investm nt in its . . . licensing.”  19 U.S.C. 
§ 1337(a)(3).  This Court has interpreted that language to allow the finding of a 
domestic industry when the only activity conducted by a patentee in the United 
States is licensing its patents.  See, e.g., InterDigital Commc’ns, LLC v. ITC, 690 
F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  Yet, under R d Wing Shoe, that same 
licensing activity would not grant a federal court personal jurisdiction over the 
patent holder in a declaratory judgment action.   
Finally, this case is an ideal vehicle for reconsidering the law of personal 
jurisdiction in declaratory judgment actions, as the district court’s holding was 
based squarely on the bright-line rule of Red Wing Shoe.  After cataloguing the 
patent holder’s extensive contacts with California, the court wrote that those 
contacts were “either related solely to [the patent holder’s] attempts to license the 
patents, which the Federal Circuit has held insufficient, or according to Federal 
Circuit law [we]re irrelevant to the parties’ instan  dispute.”  (Order Granting 
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 23, N.D. Cal. ECF No. 57, Case No. 5:14-cv-04794-
LHK, N.D. Cal. ECF No. 62, Case No. 5:14-cv-04963-LHK.)  Moreover, panels 
and judges of this Court have expressed concern about the wisdom of Red Wing 




dissenting) (“The entirety of the contacts with theforum . . . supports the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction . . . comporting with the principles of personal jurisdiction 
as elaborated by the Supreme Court.”); see also Autogenomics, Inc., 566 F.3d at 
1021 (“Although we . . . are concerned that foreign patentees . . . may engage in 
significant commercialization and licensing efforts in a state . . . we are 
nonetheless bound by Avocent.”); id. at 1028 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The 
court’s decision that [the patent holder] cannot be brought before the court . . . is 
contrary to law, precedent, and policy.”).   
II.  Public Policy Supports the Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Based on 
Licensing Efforts 
 Under a proper, case-by-case inquiry into personal jurisdiction, district 
courts would be permitted to hear declaratory judgment actions when the defendant 
has engaged in licensing efforts and activity directed at the forum state.  Not only 
does Supreme Court precedent mandate this result, pub ic policy considerations 
also warrant it. 
 First, Red Wing Shoe’s bright-line rule defeats the core patent policy of 
encouraging challenges to patent validity.  The Supreme Court has “emphasized 
the importance to the public at large of resolving questions of patent invalidity.”  
Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l., Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100 (1993) (internal 
citation omitted).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has promulgated a “group of 




Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 344 (1971).  In 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), for example, the Court 
permitted an alleged infringer to file a declaratory judgment action even though the 
alleged infringer continued to comply with a licensing agreement.  And, in 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014), the 
Court held that courts could not shift the burden of pr of on the question of 
infringement to the alleged infringer simply because the suit sought a declaratory 
judgment.     
 Like the Supreme Court, Congress has, in recent years, acted to facilitate 
quick and inexpensive challenges to patent validity.  That was, in fact, a major 
purpose of the recently enacted America Invents Act ( IA).  See Joe Matal, A 
Guide to the Legislative History of the America Inve ts Act: Part II of II, 21 Fed. 
Cir. B.J. 539, 599–601 (2011–2012).  During deliberation on the AIA, the House 
Judiciary Committee noted the “growing sense that questionable patents are too 
easily obtained and are too difficult to challenge” and emphasized that a key 
objective of the legislation was “providing a more efficient system for challenging 
patents that should not have issued[] and reducing unwarranted litigation costs.”  
H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 39–40 (2011).  Although the AIA created several new 
administrative procedures to challenge patent validity, eclaratory judgment 




have strong arguments on noninfringement—an issue the PTO is powerless to 
decide—or who have invalidity arguments that are beyond the scope of PTO 
review.  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (limiting inter partes review to novelty and 
nonobviousness).   
There is, to be sure, a robust debate among scholars about whether the PTO 
issues too many “bad patents”—that is, patents that are overly broad or that 
represent only marginal improvements in the state of he art.  See Paul R. 
Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, andthe Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 279, 279–80 (2015) (citing commentary).  
Amici differ amongst themselves as to the scope or even the existence of a “bad 
patents” problem and whether it should be a major cause of concern in patent 
policy.  They are, however, united in their professional opinion that declaratory 
judgment actions serve an important patent-clearing fu ction and that the lower 
court’s decision in this case, based on Red Wing Shoe and its progeny, raises 
improper barriers to the declaratory judgment action’s critical function in patent 
suits.   
 Second, the bright-line prohibition on personal jurisdiction adopted in Red 
Wing Shoe undermines the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act.  Congress 
enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act to open federal courts to “parties confronted 




courts because the other party possessed the cause of action.”  Lisa A. Dolak, 
Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Patent Cases: Restoring the Balance 
Between the Patentee and the Accused Infringer, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 903, 910 (1997).  
The extensive hearings held on the Declaratory Judgment Act in the years leading 
up to its enactment reveal that alleged patent infringers were among the 
beneficiaries specifically contemplated.  See Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. 
Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause 
of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction While th Supreme Court Wasn’t 
Looking, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 529, 561–73 (1989) (providing a summary of the 
fifteen-year legislative history).  In particular, during hearings on an earlier version 
of the Declaratory Judgment Act, Professor Edson R. Sunderland testified:   
I assert that I have a right to use a certain patent. You 
claim that you have a patent. What am I going to do 
about it? There is no way that I can litigate my right, 
which I claim, to use that device, except by going ahead 
and using it, and you [the patent holder] can sit back as 
long as you please and let me run up just as high a bill of 
damages as you wish to have me run up, and then you 
may sue me for the damages, and I am ruined, having 
acted all the time in good faith and on my best judgment, 
but having no way in the world to find out whether I had 
a right to use that device or not. 
 
Id. at 564 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate 




“Congress clearly contemplated . . . permit[ting] federal declaratory judgment 
actions by alleged patent infringers.”  Id. at 570.  
Thus, the Declaratory Judgment Act “allow[s] potential infringers to ‘clear 
the air’ by seeking declaratory relief in federal court instead of waiting for the 
patent owner to file an infringement suit.”  Amelia Smith Rinehart, Patent Cases 
and Public Controversies, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 361, 367 (2013).  In so doing, 
the Declaratory Judgment Act “gives the alleged infringer the additional benefit of 
choosing the forum and the time of the suit.”  Kimberly A. Moore, Timothy R. 
Holbrook & John F. Murphy, Patent Litigation and Strategy 52 (4th ed. 2013).   
 Unfortunately, the bright-line rule of Red Wing Shoe deprives accused 
infringers of one of the primary advantages of the declaratory judgment action—
the ability to control the forum.  Of course, an accused infringer should not be able 
to choose any federal court at will.  But it should, consistent wi h the purpose of 
the Declaratory Judgment Act, be able to bring suit in a forum with which the 
patent holder has constitutionally sufficient minimu  contacts.    
 Third, Red Wing Shoe’s bright-line rule improperly elevates the promotion 
of settlement over numerous other important policy considerations.  See Megan M. 
La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 375, 429–
30 (2014).  As noted, the Court in Red Wing Shoe based its refusal of jurisdiction 




claims.  148 F.3d at 1361.  Although pre-suit communications can sometimes 
promote settlement of patent disputes, that is not invariably true, as the Court 
assumed in Red Wing Shoe.  For instance, in recent years, some patent holders 
have used demand letters for the sole purpose of extracting nuisance-value 
licensing payments.  See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 
Va. L. Rev. 1579, 1581–82 (2015); Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-
Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L. Rev. 411, 423–24 (2015); Mark A. Leml y & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 2117, 
2126 (2013).  In this context, the “promotion of settlement” rationale of Red Wing 
Shoe has no application.    
Moreover, recent Supreme Court precedent casts doubt on this Court’s 
assumption that settlement of patent disputes is always in the public’s interest.  See 
F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).  In Actavis, the Supreme Court 
rejected a bright-line rule (which this Court had embraced) that settlement 
payments within the scope of a patent were immune from antitrust scrutiny, instead 
holding that those settlements should be evaluated under the rule of reason.  Id. at 
2237.  Despite a “general legal policy favoring thesettlement of disputes,” the 
Court ruled that settlements in the patent context d manded some scrutiny, 
emphasizing the “policy of eliminating unwarranted patent grants so the public will 




justification.”  Id. at 2233–34 (internal citations omitted).  Thus, while promotion 
of settlement no doubt remains a laudable goal in some contexts, Red Wing Shoe 
fails to balance that goal against other policy interests in the patent context, 
including clearing invalid patents. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should sua sponte consider this case n 
banc in order to abrogate Red Wing Shoe and its progeny.  The Court should 
instead apply the case-specific analysis of personal jurisdiction mandated by 
Supreme Court precedent.  Applying that precedent to the facts of this case, it is 
clear that personal jurisdiction exists because the pat nt holder purposefully 
targeted the forum state by sending demand letters into the state and engaging in 
in-person meetings in the state with the specific purpose of licensing the patents-
in-suit.   
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